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AIG Edition 1
- AIG Team
- 3 days ago
- 9 min read
Summary: Amman imposed a full ban on the Muslim Brotherhood and seized its property and assets in Jordan following the arrest of 16 linked individuals plotting attacks in Jordan. The outlawing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan will likely lead to more internal division and political dissent.
Development: On 23 April, Amman imposed a full ban on the Muslim Brotherhood following the arrests of 16 individuals plotting strikes in Jordan. The individuals arrested were “accused of manufacturing short-range missiles, possessing explosives and automatic weapons, concealing a ready-to-use missile, and illegally recruiting and training people,” according to Al Jazeera. The Muslim Brotherhood attempted to destroy mass amounts of documents from its offices the night before the arrests occurred. One of the 16 individuals arrested was the son of Muslim Brotherhood leadership. The Islamic Action Front (IAF), the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, won the most seats in the parliamentary elections held in September 2024. Over half of Jordan’s population is of Palestinian descent. The IAF has gained recent political popularity by using the Jordanian protests against Israel’s war on Gaza as a backdrop, according to Al Jazeera.
Analysis: The recent outlawing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan will likely cause internal division and fuel conflict between the government and the people of Jordan. IAF is likely to be put under much scrutiny in the near future due to its connections with the Muslim Brotherhood. Amman will likely attempt to force the IAF out of Jordanian politics to suppress the opposition further. The arrests of the 16 individuals will likely spark a much deeper investigation into the source of support for the operation due to the level of weapons and training infrastructure the individuals had. Jordan is the only country other than Israel that has a border with the Palestinian West Bank, likely making it a prime location for regional adversaries to gain influence to create access to the West Bank.
[Unnamed Contributor]
Summary: The U.S. has ordered additional troops to the Middle East following continued Houthi attacks. The increase of U.S. military assets in the Middle East with the goal of weakening the Houthis is likely to undermine Tehran’s negotiation power in the ongoing nuclear deal discussions with the U.S.
Development: On 22 April, the U.S. increased its military presence in the Middle East, aimed at countering the Houthis in Yemen. Washington and Tehran began several rounds of negotiations over a potential nuclear agreement on 12 April. In March, the U.S. launched a large-scale campaign of air and naval strikes on the Houthis over the group's attacks on Red Sea shipping routes. Washington warned Tehran to halt the backing of the Houthis, promising to hold them "fully accountable" for its involvement with them. In early April, Tehran transferred long-range ballistic missiles to its proxies in Iraq for the first time. Aspects of Tehran's proxy network in the Middle East have suffered large blows, with the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 and with Hezbollah's military and political power diminished from its war with Israel.
Analysis: By increasing its military presence to target the Houthis, the U.S. will likely undercut Iran’s negotiating power in ongoing nuclear discussions. Due to the weakening of Hezbollah and the Assad regime, the Houthis remain Iran’s last major proxy in the Middle East, which could eliminate its final piece of leverage in nuclear negotiations if the U.S. campaign against the Houthis proves successful. The risk posed to the Houthis by the U.S. will likely lead Iran to increase its support and efforts for the Houthis. Iran has recently supplied long-range ballistic missiles to its proxy forces in Iraq for the first time, and it will likely do the same with the Houthis for their campaign against the U.S., given that the Houthis are Iran’s last notable force in the Middle East.
[Jacob Faciana]
Summary: Hezbollah says it will not give up arms unless the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) withdraw from Southern Lebanon. Israel will likely withdraw if Hezbollah disarms south of the Litani River, thereby restoring the components of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701. Hezbollah will likely concede to this deal to salvage its political power ahead of Lebanon's Parliamentary elections in May 2026.
Background: On 18 April, Hezbollah’s leader, Naim Qassem, said it would not give up arms until an IDF withdrawal from Southern Lebanon. Tel-Aviv was supposed to withdraw in January of 2025, but has “kept troops in five places it deems strategic,” according to Naharnet. Hezbollah gave up around 190 out of its 265 military posts south of the Litani River. The United Nations Security Council established Resolution 1701 in 2006, which only allowed the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to have an armed presence South of the Litani River. Lebanon’s Parliament, including Hezbollah’s political bloc, voted in favor of ensuring that only the LAF could defend the country in terms of war. Lebanon’s Parliament will hold elections in May 2026. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun stated that the Lebanese people “no longer want war,” according to Naharnet. Hezbollah and its political allies lost a parliamentary majority in the previous elections in 2022. Iran and the U.S. initiated talks for a new nuclear agreement, raising the possibility of Iran backing away from its regional proxies. The U.S. recently stationed 30% of its stealth bombing capabilities in Diego Garcia, a military base roughly 2,100 miles south of Iran’s southern coast.
Hezbollah Likely to Disarm for Political Strength: From October to November 2024, Hezbollah and Israel engaged in conflict, leaving Hezbollah weakened both militarily and politically. The conflict severely diminished Hezbollah’s weapons stockpile. Hezbollah had the capability of sending over 10,000 projectiles into Israel a day prior to the conflict, down to around 150 projectiles a day as of today. Israel also eliminated Hezbollah’s leadership structure, leaving them weakened politically. With Hezbollah's key leadership eliminated and its military capabilities significantly reduced, the group is likely to focus on regaining political strength and restoring its image among constituents before its critical parliamentary elections in May 2026. Lebanon’s newly elected President and Prime Minister are seeking a way to disarm Hezbollah without causing internal conflict. The Lebanese Parliament’s victorious vote on establishing all defense capabilities solely under the LAF is another key step furthering the disarmament of Hezbollah.
Hezbollah’s Future Likely to be Shaped by Iran’s Lack of Influence: The fall of the Assad regime in Syria back in December of 2024 dissolved Iran’s land corridor, which utilizes its backed militias in Iraq, the previous Assad regime in Syria, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. As a result, Tehran no longer has effective access through its land corridor to resupply and strengthen Hezbollah. The degraded state of Iran’s land corridor into Lebanon will likely remain a decision-making priority in Hezbollah’s future military longevity. The struggling state of Iran’s economy is a key motivation for Tehran to establish a successful nuclear deal with the U.S. 80% of Iran’s population currently remains below the global poverty line, 55% are experiencing food insecurity, and its currency is at a 35% inflation rate. Tehran exported a lot of its economic resources to its proxies in the Middle East in efforts to build up a strong regional resistance against Israel and the U.S. With Tehran’s geopolitical ventures in reverse and its struggling economic circumstances, Tehran will likely concede to a nuclear agreement with the U.S. which likely will include factors of backing away from its regional proxies. Iran’s suffering economic situation and its severed land corridor will likely influence Hezbollah’s decision about its future goals in Lebanon.
Outlook and Implications: If Tehran concedes to a nuclear deal with the U.S., it will likely abandon its proxies in the Middle East, resulting in leaving Hezbollah with less support, further weakening them. Due to Hezbollah’s military capabilities suffering, along with Tehran’s severed land corridor, Hezbollah will likely refocus its efforts on maintaining any political power it may have left in Lebanon. Hezbollah will likely view the decision to disarm itself as a political necessity to rebuild support among constituents for the May 2026 parliamentary elections. With the overwhelming parliamentary support for the disarmament of Hezbollah and making defense capabilities exclusively under the role of the LAF, Hezbollah will likely shift priorities to re-legitimize itself in the political arena. Upcoming voters in the 2026 elections are tired of conflict and likely do not want to see possible internal conflict arise regarding the disarmament of Hezbollah to the LAF. Hezbollah will likely view its disarmament as a strategic political trade-off to regain positive political influence for the elections.
[Jacob Faciana]
Summary: Hamas attempted to seize residential areas by force, aiming to use them as bases for launching attacks. The discontent against Hamas in Gaza, along with a weakening grip on its political power, will likely prolong any ceasefire deals with Israel.
Development: On 13 April, Hamas opened fire on Gaza residents to displace them in order to repurpose their homes as launch sites for projectile attacks. The residents advanced, and eventually, they drove Hamas out of their neighborhood. The ceasefire deals proposed by Israel have contained aspects of Hamas’ weapons and political power, stating that Hamas needs to disarm itself or step down from power in Gaza in the event of a successful ceasefire deal. Throughout the last month, Gaza has seen multiple protests against Hamas, calling for the removal of the group from power. The political unrest in Gaza has resulted in aggressive suppression tactics used by Hamas. Tactics used by Hamas have included kidnapping, torture, fatal beatings, and executions against Gazans who speak out. In early April, Hamas experienced mass political dissent amongst Gazans when thousands took to the streets challenging Hamas’ power, the first time Hamas has experienced political challenges since the war with Israel started in October 2023.
Analysis: The internal legitimacy crisis that Hamas is experiencing is going to add more pressure on the group's grip on power. The Israeli ceasefire deals containing components that state Hamas must step down from power and disarm itself in Gaza are unlikely to lead to a successful ceasefire deal due to Hamas' desire for power. Hamas' recent struggle against its people for political power is likely going to lead to more brutal suppression tactics and human rights violations. Suppose Israel brokers a ceasefire deal with Hamas that does not include Hamas stepping down from power. In that case, Hamas will likely experience a post-war political crisis with its population, leading to major internal conflict. Hamas will likely keep declining ceasefire deals and create a contingency plan outside of Gaza, as they know the end of the war will likely lead to their political demise with the population in Gaza.
[Jacob Faciana]
Summary: The U.S. imposed sanctions on Chinese oil refineries for purchasing $1 billion worth of Iranian oil. With the recent tariffs placed on China, Beijing will likely avoid any further economic conflict by distancing itself from Iranian industries such as oil.
Development: On 16 April, the U.S. imposed sanctions on Chinese oil refineries for purchasing $1 billion worth of Iranian oil. Iran’s most significant economic industry is the export of its natural gas. The U.S. stated that its sanctions were imposed largely due to the proceeds going to “help finance both Tehran’s government and Iran’s support for militant groups.” according to AP News. Beijing is currently experiencing a 145% tariff on all exports to the U.S. The U.S. has imposed secondary tariffs against Iran, meaning any country that imports Iranian oil will be subject to a 25% tariff on all exports to the U.S. Beijing imports roughly 90% of all Iranian oil exports. Chinese oil imports of Iranian oil were up 20% from February to March. At the same time, Beijing was experiencing consistent tariff raises from the U.S. Tehran and Washington are currently in the midst of nuclear deal negotiations, with the third round scheduled for 26 April.
Analysis: The sanctions imposed on Beijing’s oil refineries and the secondary tariffs on all countries that import Iranian goods will likely lead Beijing to distance itself from Tehran momentarily. The 145% tariff on Beijing on all U.S. exports will likely stay in place throughout the ongoing nuclear negotiations between Tehran and Washington. As Tehran’s largest oil importer, Beijing will likely put Tehran in a highly motivated position to negotiate a successful nuclear deal with the U.S. Beijing will likely seek alternative energy sources. Saudi Arabia will likely see an increase in oil exports to China, especially if the nuclear deal negotiations between Tehran and Washington are unsuccessful.
[Unnamed Contributor]
Summary: Bangladesh’s Interim Government Advisor’s recent request for Beijing to expand its economic presence in Bangladesh likely indicates Dhaka’s moving position to prepare a seizure of Northeast India.
Development: On 31 March, reports stated that Bangladesh’s Interim Government Advisor, Muhammad Yunus, asked Beijing to expand its businesses in the Mongla Port. Yunus further stated that Bangladesh landlocks Northeast India and that China can develop and market products in Bangladesh, according to NDTV World. China and Bangladesh surround Northeast India, with a narrow passage from the mainland to reach the region. China-Bangladesh relations strengthened in 2019 when Bangladesh joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), while India has yet to join the BRI. Since 2022, Bangladesh’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rate decreased 2%, with a forecast of 5.1% for 2025, according to the Asian Development Bank.
Analysis: Dhaka’s request for Beijing to expand its businesses in Bangladesh likely signals a long-term strategy to position itself for a potential attempt to seize Northeast India with China’s assistance in the 2030s. While Yunus’s appeal for Chinese investment may stem from Bangladesh’s declining GDP and need for economic aid, it more likely indicates a strategic move to strengthen ties with Beijing in preparation for future actions. In agreeing to Yunus’s request, Beijing will highly likely expand not only its economic presence around Mongla Port but also its military presence. The geographical positioning of Bangladesh and China around Northeast India would almost certainly weaken India’s defensive capabilities in the region. However, given its declining GDP, Dhaka will unlikely attempt the seizure in the near future. Bangladesh’s participation in the BRI almost certainly further solidifies its alliance with Beijing, particularly giving leverage that India does not have with China. While Chinese economic investments may help improve Bangladesh’s GDP, it remains unlikely that either nation will pursue a seizure of Northeast India within the next five years, as Dhaka is not yet militarily or economically prepared.
[Lauren Estrada]
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